Iran in Data
iran_unido_cip__regional_comparison_2010_20142010–2014Download CSV

UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) Rank & Score, Iran vs. Regional Economies

Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Kazakhstan, Qatar, Iran, Egypt.

Visualizer_Mode
Measure
Calendar

Event_Log

  1. ··1931Foreign Trade Monopoly LawCorrelationExpected causation

    Majlis grants the government a monopoly over all foreign trade, empowering it to set import quotas tied to non-oil export proceeds and to establish state trading companies for sugar, tea, opium, tobacco and cereals -- the legal basis for an import-substitution industrialization strategy.

    Why this link: The state trading monopoly and import quotas created the protected domestic market that underpinned the roughly 265 new plants of the 1930s import-substitution industrialization drive.

    Caveat: No sectoral value-added data exists for the 1930s; the link is to the historical process, not the charted series itself.

  2. 011934State-led industrialization drive acceleratesCorrelationExpected causation

    Backed by high protective tariffs and Bank Melli financing, state and private investment establish roughly 265 new plants (textiles, sugar refining, cement, matches, glass) between 1930 and 1940, with industrial growth peaking in 1934-38 under direct state direction.

    Why this link: This 1930-40 wave of roughly 265 new state- and privately-built plants (textiles, sugar, cement, matches, glass), financed by Bank Melli under high protective tariffs, is the founding episode of Iran's modern industrial sector that these value-added series describe.

    Caveat: No national accounts by sector exist for the 1930s; the link is to the historical process these categories describe, not measurable in the charted data itself.

Related_Laws

Laws related to this measure. Correlation = how closely this law tracks this measure's story. Expected causation = how strongly we would expect it to have moved the line. Neither is a claim of proof.

  1. 1969CorrelationExpected causationAct on the Purchase of Agricultural Land for Industrial and Mining Needs

    Passed in 1969, this law lets state and private industrial and mining enterprises lease or purchase farmland, including tenant farmers' cultivation rights, needed for their projects, with the price set by negotiation or, failing agreement, by a government commission, and gives displaced farm workers priority for jobs at the new facility.

    Why this link: The land acquired under this law was earmarked for industrial and mining sites, giving it an indirect channel into industrial value added.

    Caveat: Industrial value added is driven overwhelmingly by capital investment, oil-financed development spending, and macro conditions, not land-acquisition mechanics.

  2. 1988CorrelationExpected causationBylaw on Financial and Equipment Assistance to Holders of Industrial Research Licenses

    This bylaw provides financial and equipment assistance to holders of industrial research licenses.

    Why this link: This 1988 bylaw provides financial and equipment aid to holders of industrial research permits, an incentive instrument aimed at boosting industrial R&D and, through it, industrial-sector output and value added.

    Caveat: Industrial value added is driven overwhelmingly by oil-sector linkages, import substitution policy, and the war economy in this period; the effect of this narrow research-incentive bylaw cannot be separately measured.

    Lag: Multi-year lag as R&D investments mature into production gains.
  3. 2003CorrelationExpected causationAct on Facilitating Industrial Modernization and Amending Article 113 of the Third Development Plan Act

    Passed in 2003, this law aims to remove obstacles to industrial modernization by letting banks finance the bid and performance guarantees Iranian contractors need to compete for domestic and foreign industrial and construction projects, in order to boost local content and employment.

    Why this link: Enacted under the Third Development Plan (1382/2003), this omnibus law facilitates financing for industrial renovation and modernization, touching customs, banking, mining, and state-land transfer rules relevant to industrial firms.

    Caveat: An omnibus facilitation law with diffuse effects across many sectors; industrial value added is driven far more by sanctions, energy input costs, and exchange rates than by this specific financing-facilitation statute.

  4. 2009CorrelationExpected causationBylaw on the Manner of Supplying Electricity and Fuel to Industries

    Approved in 2009 (1387), this bylaw requires the industries ministry, with the oil and power ministries, to give new-plant applicants outside industrial parks a standardized energy-supply guide, obliges the oil ministry to guarantee natural gas to gas-fed plants, requires equal fuel and subsidy treatment for state and private power plants, and lets industrial consumers connect to the grid either by building a captive power plant or by signing bilateral power-purchase contracts with private generators.

    Why this link: This 2009 bylaw set the arrangements for supplying electricity and fuel to industrial plants, a real operational channel affecting industrial output and the reliability of the energy access that underpins the manufacturing sector.

    Caveat: Industrial value-added and electricity-access aggregates reflect investment, sanctions, and broader energy-supply conditions far more than a single administrative bylaw on supply arrangements; its specific effect cannot be isolated.

  5. 2009CorrelationExpected causationExecutive Bylaw on the Classification of Enterprises, Certification of Financial Statements, and Marketing of Enterprises Subject to Divestiture

    Sets the procedure for privatizing state-owned enterprises: classifying them by financial and operational criteria, requiring certified audits of their financial statements before sale, and defining how they are marketed and offered to buyers under the state privatization program.

    Why this link: Governs the restructuring and sale of state-owned industrial and mining enterprises, affecting sectoral value-added composition.

    Caveat: Sectoral value added is dominated by energy prices, sanctions, and input costs; the effect of enterprise valuation/marketing rules alone is not separable.

  6. 2015CorrelationExpected causationExecutive Bylaw of Article 44 of the Act on Removing Obstacles to Competitive Production and Improving the Country's Financial System

    Approved in 2015, this bylaw allows the government to co-invest, up to a maximum 49% share, in non-governmental research and technology funds that finance applied research and technology development by the private sector.

    Why this link: Privatized enterprises under Article 44 span manufacturing, mining, and industrial sectors, so the program bears on sectoral value-added trends.

    Caveat: Sectoral value added is shaped by many structural and cyclical factors; the specific contribution of privatization transfers cannot be isolated.

    Lag: Multi-year.
  7. 2025CorrelationExpected causationExecutive Bylaw of Sub-item (7) of Clause (d) of Article (48) of the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan Act of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Subject: Allocation of Presold Petrochemical Company Products, for Which There Is No Export Commitment, to Downstream Complexes or Units along the Value Chain)

    This executive bylaw implements a provision of the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan Act allocating presold petrochemical products with no export commitment to downstream complexes or units along the value chain.

    Why this link: Implements clause 7(d)(4) directing petrochemical output that goes unexported and pre-sold to be allocated to downstream domestic units along the value chain, an industrial feedstock-supply instrument for petrochemical derivatives manufacturing.

    Caveat: A 2025 implementing bylaw too recent to show measurable effects in available series; it channels output rather than creating it, so its contribution to industrial value added is real but hard to isolate from broader petrochemical capacity trends.

    Lag: Too recent (2025) for lagged effects to appear in current data.

Related_Charts