Money & Quasi-Money Component Movements, Year-over-Year Flows (FY1963-1973)_

Event_Log

1. 011927Bank Melli Iran establishedCorrelationExpected causation

   Iran's first national bank founded, taking over currency-issuing functions previously held by the British Imperial Bank of Persia.

   Why this link: Bank Melli, founded here, is literally one of the two institutions ("National Bank") whose private-sector deposits, advances and money-supply claims this chart tracks.

   Caveat: Chart data begins three decades after founding; captures the bank's mature operations, not its 1927 start.

   Lag: ~30 years to charted dataSource: Encyclopaedia Iranica
2. 021960Central Bank of Iran establishedCorrelationExpected causation

   The Monetary and Banking Act of 7 Khordad 1339 (28 May 1960) creates Bank Markazi-e Iran, transferring central-banking functions -- currency issue, bank supervision, monetary policy -- from Bank Melli Iran to a dedicated central bank with initial capital of 3.6 billion rials.

   Why this link: This chart's series begins in exactly 1960, tracking the assets of the institution created by this law with initial capital of 3.6 billion rials.

   Caveat: None significant; the institution and the chart's start year coincide exactly.

   Lag: ImmediateSource: Encyclopaedia Iranica (Bank-e Markazi-e Iran)
3. 031960First IMF stand-by arrangement and stabilization programCorrelationExpected causation

   Facing a balance-of-payments crisis after falling oil prices leave reserves covering barely one to two weeks of imports, Iran draws on a 35m-SDR IMF stand-by arrangement and adopts an austerity program that sharply curbs bank credit expansion and government spending through 1962.

   Why this link: The austerity program explicitly curbed bank credit expansion to government through 1962, the exact channel this claims-on-central-government growth series measures.

   Caveat: No data exists for this exact 1960-62 window in the charted series; effect is documented historically.

   Lag: Immediate to 2 yearsSource: Iranian Studies (Cambridge University Press) -- Balance of Payment Deficit and Inflation in Iran 1955-1962
4. 0420032000s commodity super-cycleCorrelationExpected causation

   China's post-2001 WTO-driven infrastructure boom, alongside strong global growth, drives the IMF commodity price index up roughly fourfold between January 2000 and mid-2008; crude oil rises from about $30/barrel in 2003 to a record $147/barrel on 11 July 2008, delivering a sustained fiscal windfall to every oil exporter in this database (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia) before the Global Financial Crisis abruptly ends the cycle.

   Why this link: The Ahmadinejad government channeled the oil windfall into expansionary spending and cheap credit, driving rapid growth in money supply and the monetary base from the mid-2000s.

   Caveat: Domestic banking-sector policy choices, not the price cycle alone, determined how much of the windfall became liquidity growth.

   Lag: 1-3 years.Source: US Energy Information Administration
5. 052015Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) signedCorrelationExpected causation

   Iran and the P5+1 finalize the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in Vienna, exchanging nuclear-program limits for the lifting of UN, EU and US nuclear-related sanctions; roughly $100bn in frozen Iranian assets are released after IAEA-verified implementation begins in January 2016.

   Why this link: Sanctions relief beginning in January 2016 allowed Iran to roughly double its oil exports within a year, directly lifting fuel's share of merchandise exports.

   Caveat: The recovery in export volume was also constrained by upstream investment shortfalls after years of underinvestment, so the rebound was not as complete as sanctions relief alone would predict.

   Lag: 6-12 months (implementation began January 2016).Source: European External Action Service
6. 062018US withdraws from the JCPOACorrelationExpected causation

   President Trump announces US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and directs the phased reimposition of all sanctions lifted in 2015-16, with full "snapback" effective 5 November 2018, reversing the 2015 sanctions-relief framework and re-isolating Iran's oil and banking sectors from the dollar system.

   Why this link: Snapback sanctions from November 2018 cut Iran's oil exports by roughly two-thirds within a year, a direct and well-documented collapse in the fuel share of merchandise exports.

   Caveat: None significant: the mechanism (US secondary sanctions on oil buyers) and the export data are both well documented and closely aligned in timing.

   Lag: Within 6 months of the November 2018 snapback.Source: OFAC — May 2018 Guidance on Reimposing Certain Sanctions with Respect to Iran

Related_Laws

Laws related to this measure. Correlation = how closely this law tracks this measure's story. Expected causation = how strongly we would expect it to have moved the line. Neither is a claim of proof.

1. 1959CorrelationExpected causationAct Authorizing the Establishment of the Bank of Foreign Trade of Iran

   Passed on 28 Esfand 1337 (1959), this act authorizes Bank Melli Iran to buy the Export Development Bank's shares held by the Plan Organization and Bimeh Iran and reconstitute it as the Bank of Foreign Trade of Iran, capping foreign nationals' share ownership in the new bank at 49 percent.

   Why this link: This 1959 law authorizes creation of Iran's Foreign Trade Bank (Bank Tejarat's predecessor institution focus), a dedicated trade-finance institution that became part of the banking system's monetary and credit aggregates.

   Caveat: One new specialized bank is a small part of a banking system whose aggregate monetary indicators are driven mainly by macroeconomic and monetary-policy conditions, not by any single institution's founding.

   Lag: Structural, institution-building effect over subsequent decades
2. 1979CorrelationExpected causationAct Amending the Bank Nationalization Act

   Passed in 1979 by the Revolutionary Council, this brief law exempts the banks nationalized earlier that year from Article 116 of the Commercial Code.

   Why this link: Bank nationalization is the foundational structural reform of Iran's post-revolutionary financial sector; any serious account of Iran's monetary aggregates and credit system must reference it.

   Caveat: Its specific quantitative contribution to any single monetary series cannot be isolated from war financing, sanctions, and decades of subsequent banking-law amendments.

   Lag: Structural effects persist over decades.
3. 1979CorrelationExpected causationAct on the Administration of Banks' Affairs

   Enacted 1358/07/03 (1979) by the Revolutionary Council following the nationalization of Iran's banks, it establishes a unified governance structure for all state-owned banks: a General Assembly of ministers, a Supreme Council of Banks, and each bank's own board and CEO, and empowers the General Assembly to group, merge or dissolve banks.

   Why this link: This 1979 decree nationalized the administration of Iran's private banks, restructuring the entire banking system into state ownership; it is the direct legal act reshaping deposit, credit, and central-bank financing patterns visible in Iran's post-revolution monetary series.

   Caveat: The post-revolution monetary series also reflects war financing, sanctions, and inflation, so nationalization's specific contribution to any single year's movement is hard to isolate even though the structural break itself is well documented.

   Lag: Immediate structural change in 1979, with effects compounding through the 1980s.
4. 1979CorrelationExpected causationBank Nationalization Act

   Passed in 1979 immediately after the revolution, this law declares all banks in Iran nationalized, citing the need to protect deposits and national capital, and empowers the government to appoint new bank managers whose signatures alone are legally valid.

   Why this link: As the direct legal instrument that converted every private bank into a state-owned institution, this law is the explicit cause of the structural shift visible across Iran's banking and monetary statistics from 1979 onward.

   Caveat: The law explains the ownership structure of the banking system, not the subsequent level of deposits, credit, or money supply, which respond to monetary policy, inflation, and sanctions in each period.

5. 1979CorrelationExpected causationLegal Bill on Providing a Credit of Ten Billion to Bank Refah Kargaran through the Central Bank of Iran

   This bill directs the Central Bank of Iran to provide a credit of ten billion to Bank Refah Kargaran (the Workers' Welfare Bank).

   Why this link: This 1979 decree has the Central Bank of Iran extend a 10-billion-rial credit facility to the Workers' Welfare Bank, a direct monetary-policy transaction of the kind recorded in Iran's central-bank-to-government/banking-system debt series during the immediate post-revolution period.

   Caveat: A single, one-off credit facility to one bank is a small line item next to the much larger swings in central-bank credit to government and the banking system over these turbulent years, so it can only be read as one contributing transaction, not the driver of the aggregate series.

6. 1980CorrelationExpected causationLegal Bill Amending the Legal Bill Concerning the Extension of the 1357 (1978-1979) Fiscal Year of All Nationalized Banks and Credit Institutions until 17/3/1358 (June 7, 1979)

   This legal bill amends an earlier legal bill that had extended the 1357 (1978-1979) fiscal year of all nationalized banks and credit institutions until 17/3/1358 (June 7, 1979).

   Why this link: As part of the nationalized-bank legal framework, this amendment bears generally on Iran's early-1980s monetary and credit system.

   Caveat: A narrow follow-on amendment among many banking-law changes of the period; not separately measurable.

   Lag: Diffuse effect over subsequent years.
7. 1983CorrelationExpected causationInterest-Free Banking Act

   Passed in 1983, this law restructures Iran's banking system on Islamic, interest-free principles, replacing conventional interest-based lending with instruments such as profit-and-loss sharing and qard al-hasaneh, and defines the objectives and functions of the national banking system.

   Why this link: The 1983 Usury-Free (Interest-Free) Banking Law is the foundational legal instrument that restructured Iran's entire post-revolution banking system around profit-and-loss-sharing contracts (mozarebeh, mosharekat) instead of fixed interest, replacing conventional deposit and lending arrangements nationwide; it is the explicit legal basis for how Iranian banks have operated since 1983.

   Caveat: In practice, many 'profit rates' under this law function similarly to interest rates and are set administratively by the Central Bank, so the law's effect is diffused through decades of subsequent regulation; monetary aggregates are also driven by oil revenue, government borrowing, and sanctions far more than by the contractual form of banking itself.

   Lag: 5+ years (structural transformation)
8. 2007CorrelationExpected causationExecutive Bylaw of the Unorganized Monetary Market Regulation Act

   Implements the Act on Regulating the Unorganized Monetary Market by requiring non-bank credit and financial institutions, currency exchange bureaus and leasing companies to obtain a license from the Central Bank of Iran and comply with its prudential and capital rules, bringing informal money-lending and credit activity under Central Bank supervision.

   Why this link: As a national-scale regulation of informal money markets, this law is a major channel into Iran's broader monetary aggregates, interest-rate structure, and consequently the inflation dynamics that a large, price-setting informal credit market can amplify.

   Caveat: Monetary aggregates, interest rates, and inflation in Iran are shaped by many larger forces, government deficit financing, sanctions, exchange-rate pass-through, so this law's specific contribution is real but cannot be isolated from those.

   Lag: 1-3 years, diffuse.
9. 2009CorrelationExpected causationPolicy and Supervisory Regulations for the Banking Network for the Year 1388 (2009)

   Issued in 2009 by the Money and Credit Council, this annual banking regulation set the ceilings on legal reserve ratios (13-17 percent depending on deposit type), capped the provisional profit rates banks could pay on investment deposits (9-17.5 percent depending on term), set a maximum bank commission (haq al-vekaleh) of 3 percent, and mandated that at least 25 percent of bank facilities go to the water and agriculture sector.

   Why this link: These annual policy and supervisory directives for Iran's banking network set lending priorities, reserve requirements, and interest-rate guidance for 2009, a real channel into monetary aggregates and credit conditions that year.

   Caveat: Monetary aggregates and credit growth reflect the cumulative effect of successive years of directives plus oil-revenue inflows and sanctions, so this single year's directive cannot be isolated as the cause of any specific movement.

10. 2016CorrelationExpected causationAmendment to the Executive Bylaw of the Anti-Money Laundering Act

    Amends the executive bylaw implementing Iran's Anti-Money Laundering Act.

    Why this link: Amends the implementing bylaw of the anti-money-laundering law, tightening banking-sector compliance and controls, part of the broader regulatory environment shaping deposit and credit flows through the banking system.

    Caveat: Broad money and banking aggregates in this period are dominated by sanctions, inflation and monetary-base growth; a compliance bylaw's own effect on these aggregates is diffuse and cannot be isolated.