Iran in Data
wdi__TM.VAL.MRCH.CD1960–2025Download CSV

Merchandise imports (current US$)

Merchandise imports (current US$)

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  1. 011974Great Civilization spending surge -- Fifth Plan revisedAssociation

    Following the 1973-74 oil price quadrupling, government oil revenue rises from $5bn to $19bn in a year; the Shah revises the Fifth Development Plan, nearly doubling total planned investment from $36.5bn to $70bn and raising overall government spending from $44bn to $123bn, fueling severe absorptive-capacity bottlenecks and inflation.

    Why this link: Imports rose from $3.39bn (1973) to $5.43bn (1974, +60.1%) to $10.34bn (1975, +90.4% further, +204.8% cumulative), tracking the Shah's revision of the Fifth Development Plan (investment nearly doubled from $36.5bn to $70bn, total government spending from $44bn to $123bn) that the 1973-74 oil windfall financed -- a textbook oil-boom import surge.

    Lag: immediate, compounding over 2 yearsSource: Intereconomics (Naini) -- The Fifth Development Plan
  2. 021979Islamic RevolutionAssociation

    Mohammad Reza Shah's government falls; the Islamic Republic is proclaimed under Ayatollah Khomeini on 1 April 1979.

    Why this link: Imports fell from $13.55bn (1978) to $9.74bn (1979), -28.1%, as the revolution disrupted trade financing, banking, and the general commercial economy.

    Caveat: The Nov 1979 US asset freeze and embassy hostage crisis fall late in this same year and add to the disruption, so 1979's full-year figure reflects a build-up of shocks, not one single dated event.

  3. 031993Exchange-rate unification attemptAssociation

    Rafsanjani government attempts to unify Iran's multiple-tier exchange rate system; the effort partially unwinds after reserve pressure.

    Why this link: Imports fell from $27.93bn (1991, the post-war reconstruction peak) to $25.86bn (1992) to $21.43bn (1993) to $13.77bn (1994, -50.7% cumulative from the 1991 peak) as Rafsanjani's attempted exchange-rate unification collided with reserve pressure and partially unwound, forcing a sharp compression of the import-financed reconstruction boom that had followed the Iran-Iraq War.

    Caveat: The decline is gradual across four years and overlaps with a general post-reconstruction-boom cooling that would likely have occurred to some degree even without the FX-policy episode -- confidence kept at 'contributing' rather than 'causal' for that reason.

  4. 042011NDAA Section 1245 targets Central Bank of IranAssociation

    Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act requires blocking the US-jurisdiction property of Iranian financial institutions including the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), and threatens foreign banks that knowingly conduct significant CBI transactions with loss of direct access to the US financial system -- a major escalation targeting Iran's oil-revenue payment channels that helps trigger the rial's collapse the following year.

    Why this link: Imports fell from $61.76bn (2011) to $57.29bn (2012, -7.2%) to $46.57bn (2013, -18.7% further, -24.6% cumulative) as the same Central Bank/SWIFT/EU sanctions cluster that crushed exports also cut off the hard-currency and banking-channel access needed to pay for imports.

  5. 052018US withdraws from JCPOAAssociation

    President Trump announces US withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of sanctions after 90/180-day wind-down periods (effective Aug 7 and Nov 5, 2018).

    Why this link: Imports fell from $49.35bn (2018) to $41.83bn (2019, -15.2%) to $38.76bn (2020, -7.3% further, -21.5% cumulative) after sanctions reimposition cut hard-currency availability, compounded by the 2020 COVID-19 shock.

    Caveat: Import declines here are proportionally milder than the export declines over the same window (-21.5% vs. -54.6%), consistent with Iran prioritizing scarce foreign exchange for essential imports (food, medicine, intermediate goods) even as export earnings collapsed.

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