Control of Corruption - Governance score_

Event_Log

1. ··1928Capitulations abolishedCorrelationExpected causation

   Iran unilaterally ends the 19th-century capitulations regime under which foreign nationals held extraterritorial legal immunity from Iranian courts, asserting full Iranian judicial sovereignty over foreign nationals.

   Why this link: Ending extraterritorial legal immunity for foreign nationals was a foundational assertion of judicial sovereignty, part of the broader legal-modernization program later loosely reflected in rule-of-law governance scoring.

   Caveat: No continuous rule-of-law measure exists for the intervening seven decades (WGI data begins only in 1996); link is illustrative context only.

   Lag: Not measurableSource: Encyclopaedia Iranica (Commerce vii. In the Pahlavi and post-Pahlavi periods)
2. ··1979Bonyad Mostazafan founded from confiscated Pahlavi assetsCorrelationExpected causation

   Ayatollah Khomeini decrees the creation of the Bonyad-e Mostazafan (Foundation of the Oppressed), successor to the Pahlavi Foundation, to administer assets confiscated from the former royal family and dozens of associates of the old regime; within a decade its holdings reportedly exceed $20bn across roughly 140 factories, 470 agribusinesses, 100 construction firms, 64 mines and 250 commercial companies, becoming one of several bonyad conglomerates operating outside normal budgetary and tax oversight.

   Why this link: The bonyads created from confiscated Pahlavi-era assets became large, tax-exempt, unaudited parastatal conglomerates operating outside normal state oversight, a structural feature any serious account of Iran's corruption-control record must mention.

   Caveat: World Governance Indicators scores only begin in 1996, so the link to this 1979 founding is inferred from a persistent institutional feature rather than a measured before/after change, and many other factors also drive the score.

   Lag: Multi-decade, structuralSource: Wikipedia -- Mostazafan Foundation (cross-checked against Wikipedia's Bonyad overview article)
3. 012009Telecommunication Company of Iran privatized to IRGC-linked consortiumCorrelationExpected causation

   A 50%-plus-one-share controlling stake in TCI is sold for $7.8bn to the Mobin Trust Consortium (Etemad-e Mobin) -- backed by the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, the Mostazafan Foundation and the Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order -- after the only private-sector competing bidder is disqualified on security grounds; the deal becomes the largest transaction in Tehran Stock Exchange history and a widely cited example of Article 44 'privatization' shifting state assets to parastatal/IRGC-linked entities rather than the private sector.

   Why this link: A flagship Article-44 privatization sale in which the sole private competing bidder was disqualified on security grounds and the controlling stake went to an IRGC-linked consortium is a textbook case of insider-favoring privatization that erodes control-of-corruption scores.

   Caveat: The WGI control-of-corruption score reflects many years of accumulated governance perceptions, so a single privatization deal is only one contributing input among many.

   Lag: 1-3 years (annual WGI update)Source: American Enterprise Institute (cross-checked against Wikipedia -- Telecommunication Company of Iran, citing AP/Reuters)

Related_Laws

Laws related to this measure. Correlation = how closely this law tracks this measure's story. Expected causation = how strongly we would expect it to have moved the line. Neither is a claim of proof.

1. 2008CorrelationExpected causationAnti-Money Laundering Act

   Passed in 1387 (2008), the Anti-Money Laundering Act obliges banks, financial institutions, and other regulated entities to identify customers, report suspicious transactions, and establish internal controls to prevent the laundering of illicit proceeds through Iran's financial system.

   Why this link: The 2008 Anti-Money Laundering Law created Iran's formal AML/CFT legal framework, a real channel affecting international perceptions of regulatory quality and corruption control, both of which also interact with Iran's sanctions and FATF listing history.

   Caveat: Governance scores for Iran are dominated by broader political and sanctions dynamics; the law's specific contribution to these composite indices is not separable from those larger forces.